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Abstract: The urban environment is a known vulnerability for US
forces, and it grows more acute as megacities increase around the
world. This article describes past research and joint experimentation
efforts concerning urban environments and identifies critical gaps
for further research and experimentation. A more committed Joint
Force constituency, led by the US Army, can lead to better readiness in this area.

T

he US Army is currently examining the topic of megacities and
how to train, organize, and equip itself for successful operations
in them. As a recent report from the Army Chief of Staff ’s
Strategic Studies Group stressed, “it is inevitable that at some point the
United States Army will be asked to operate in a megacity and currently
the Army is ill-prepared to do so.”1 As other authors have noted, Army
researchers have determined megacities, urban concentrations exceeding
10 million people, will be the most complex environments for future land
operations. Global growth trends also suggest the importance of such
complex environments is increasing, “…since the places where people
live are getting increasingly crowded, urban, coastal and networked, the
wars people fight will take on the same characteristics.”2
Given such trends, the Army is justified in asking whether current
urban operating concepts and capabilities will suffice to accomplish
future national security objectives. Numerous studies related to urban
operations exist, all with different focus areas and outcomes, some of
which are inconsistent or incomplete. In fact, as this article maintains,
the current Department of Defense (DoD) urban strategy is on an
uncertain trajectory and is in need of new leadership.
Until its closure in 2011, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) supported
other geographic combatant commands advocating for, and developing,
future concepts for joint warfighting. However, the closure of JFCOM
and its inability to obtain approval of a Joint Capabilities Document
stalled urban concept development. Perhaps JFCOM was never the best
choice for this endeavor but merely a pragmatic one, given the Army’s
preoccupation with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless,
DoD needs another organization to refresh its dated urban strategy and
capitalize on JFCOM’s prior work.
1      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army:
Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future (Arlington, VA: Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic
Studies Group, Megacities Concept Team, June 2014), 3.
2      David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla (New York: Oxford
Press, 2013), 27-28.

COL William (Bill)
Adamson, USA (ret),
is currently Director,
Joint Planning and
Strategic Land
Power Programs, at
Systems Planning and
Analysis (SPA), Inc. in
Alexandria, Virginia.
His previous military
assignments include
multiple combat
deployments, joint
tours, and Pentagon
assignments on the
Army and OSD staff.

46

Parameters 45(1) Spring 2015

What organization is best suited for addressing this projected challenge? Establishing yet another ad hoc joint task force is neither optimal
or desirable. Giving responsibility to the Joint Staff seems misplaced
because it is not charged with organizing, training, and equipping the
force. Creating a joint program office is an option, but only desirable
if one of the military services is willing to lead as the Joint Executive
Agent. The Title X statute prescribes that the three services organize,
train, and equip their respective forces. It is unlikely the Air Force or
Navy would give priority to this effort. The Marine Corps contributes
greatly to urban concept development; however, the Marine Corps as an
amphibious force does not view urban operations as a core competency.
Among the services, the Army provides the largest share of the capability and capacity for operating in urban environments. As the nation’s
predominant land force, the task of reviving DoD’s dormant urban
strategy logically falls to the Army.

Originating Directives

The 2014 Army Operating Concept (AOC) builds a narrative of
future warfare describing urban operating environments as likely to
have “significant impact on land force operations.”3 Clearly, land forces
must prepare for all future operating environments and cannot organize, train, and equip exclusively for urban battle-spaces. Forces should
be tailored to provide the maximum flexibility to deal with a wide range
of operating environments, conflicts, and contingencies. The Army
must transform current forces with new capabilities for urban operating
environments. In short, the central problem for the Army is: how to
balance envisioned requirements for urban operations with other future
demands.
In 2000, a Government Accounting Office report stated: “despite
a growing unease that the urban environment is a known vulnerability
of US forces, DoD has not made a major commitment to dramatically
improve urban capabilities.” It thus recommended, “the Secretary of
Defense designate a focal point for developing strategy for improving
US urban operations capability; identifying doctrine, training, and
equipment shortcomings; proposing and prioritizing investments; and
coordinating service and Joint efforts in this regard.”4
In the wake of this recommendation and directives issued in the
2001 Defense Planning Guidance, US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
commissioned the Institute for Defense Analyses to develop a roadmap.
This roadmap provides “directions to pursue in order to improve significantly the capabilities of future Joint Force Commanders to conduct
military operations involving urban terrain.”5 The 370-page document
took eight people, eighteen months to draft.6 The Joint Urban Operations
3      US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex
World 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: US Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 2014), 12.
4      US General Accounting Office, Military Capabilities: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare US
Forces for Combat in Urban Areas, NSIAD-00-63NI (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office,
February 25, 2000)
5      US Joint Forces Command, Joint Urban Operations (JUO) Master Plan 2012-2017 (Washington,
DC: US Joint Forces Command, February 2006)
6      Dr. Bill Hurley (Institute for Defense Analysis), interview with author, January 8, 2015.
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(JUO) Master Plan 2012-2017 followed.7 The Master Plan is a DoD-wide
strategy from the Secretary of Defense to all DoD components. JFCOM
became the DoD Executive Agent forming a Joint Program Office to
lead DoD concept development and experimentation. Executive agency
gave JFCOM technology-transfer authority allowing it to structure
partnerships with industry, exchange technical data, make technology
assessments, and collaborate on research and development efforts. Any
organization charged with similar responsibility would benefit greatly
from this type of arrangement.

JFCOM’s Urban Roadmap

JFCOM held a human-in-the-loop, concept-based experiment
to explore new concepts in urban operations.8 This joint experiment,
Urban Resolve, ran from 2004 to 2006. The Army Dismounted Battle
Lab examined key elements of the Army Concept and Capability
Development Plan using Urban Resolve as its capstone event for US Army
Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) 2006 Experimentation
Program. The exercise asked two questions:
1. How can we fight in urban terrain against an intelligent, determined,
well-equipped adversary and win quickly without unacceptable casualties
to ourselves or our allies, unacceptable civilian casualties, or unacceptable
destruction of infrastructure? and;
2. How can we determine which concepts, materiel, tactics, techniques, and
procedures are most effective for fighting in urban terrain?9

Both questions remain relevant today - the latter particularly for the
Army.
Following the exercise, conceptualizing an intellectual framework
for further analytical and planning activities became a key task. The
central problem became: “How to operate in an urban environment to
defeat adversaries embedded and diffused within populated urban areas
without causing catastrophic damage to the functioning of the society
there.”10 The moral imperative to protect noncombatants anticipates
two additional doctrinal limitations for military forces: (1) minimize
collateral damage to noncombatants; (2) preserve the urban network as
much as possible so the human inhabitants not suffer needlessly.
JFCOM’s experimentation led to a Joint Integrating Concept which
acknowledged: (1) “The distinctive features of cities – artificial terrain,
human density, and supporting infrastructure – tend to negate Joint
force strengths, and, (2) the future urban fight is – perhaps more than
any other context of warfare – conditioned by the “battle of narratives”
among combatants to secure legitimacy and authority in the eyes of
a target population.”11 Subsequently, Joint Publication 3.06, Joint Urban

7      US Joint Forces Command, Joint Urban Operations (JUO) Master Plan 2012-2017.
8      Mike Postma (COL US Army), Urban Resolve 2015, Senior Executive After Action Review
October 27, 2006, presented as part of After Action Review to Phase 2 of Urban Resolve 2015.
9      Ibid.
10     US Department of Defense, Joint Urban Operations: Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1.0 (Suffolk,
VA: US Department of Defense, US Joint Forces Command, 2007), 5.
11     Ibid.
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Operations (2013) grew from to the Joint Integrating Concept completed
six years earlier.
Additionally, in 2008, the Joint Readiness Oversight Council
reviewed a Joint Capabilities Document for Battlespace Awareness in
Joint Urban Operations. This document mapped 212 tasks to achieve 12
capabilities; 141 of the tasks had one or more gaps. To identify possible
solutions for closing these gaps, several analytic projects were proposed
each with recommended sponsors. The council did not approve the
document because proposed project sponsors, including the Army, were
unwilling to participate.12
Shortly after the council’s decision, further urban experimentation
stalled due to a shift in priority. The JFCOM Commander established a
Joint Irregular Warfare Program Office, transferring primacy for urban
operations and a portion of the budget to this new office. In 2011,
JFCOM was deactivated, its documentation was archived, and staff reassignments diluted its expertise and intuitional knowledge. Consequently,
JFCOM experimentation has had little influence on Army decisions with
regard to urban operations.

Army Megacity Experimentation

Besides JFCOM’s efforts, the Chief of Staff of the Army sponsored
a series of “think-tank” exercises called, Unified Quest, which explored
operations in megacities as part of its future study program in 2003.
Unified Quest 2003 took a joint operational perspective for planning
offensive operations in a fictional city of 17 million people defended
by conventional, state-sponsored forces and popular forces.13 Notable
insights included:
•• The need for strong information operations;
•• Special Operations Forces and indigenous allies are invaluable;
•• Joint and Army sensors and precision strike weapons optimized for
open warfare in uncluttered terrain are of limited value in cities;
•• Stability and support activities will be inseparable from combat
operations.
Following Unified Quest in 2003, the current version of Army Field
Manual 3-06, Urban Operations, was revised. The new edition, published
in October 2006, appears to need further review and updating.
In 2014, Army research fellows from the Chief of Staff of the Army’s
Strategic Studies Group developed an appreciation for large urban
populations by using case-study vignettes of megacities from around
the world. Their white paper claimed megacities occupy strategic key
terrain “making their stability necessary for global connectedness and
order.”14 The paper continues, “The Army is currently unprepared…the
Army must lead.”15
12     US Department of Defense, Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Urban Operations, Draft
(Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, September 25, 2009), 4.
13     Don Holder (LTG US Army, Ret.), “Operations in a Megacity: Blue Commander’s
Perspective,” presented at Unified Quest After Action Review, 2004.
14     Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army:
Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future, 5.
15     Ibid, 22.
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Again in 2014, Unified Quest reassessed the issue of the US Army’s
ability to conduct operations in megacities. This theme continues into
2015. Most of the observations made in 2014 focus on understanding
the population, getting higher quality situational awareness information before and during operations, as well as a requirement to consider
all aspects and methods of transportation. Concept development
has focused on the operational environments: physical, social, and
informational.16

Other Experimentation and Research

Along with the Army Strategic Studies Group white paper, other
joint and interagency work began in 2014. The Strategic Multi-Layer
Assessment Program, an ad hoc group accepted by the Joint Staff,
provides planning support to commands with complex operational
imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are
not within core service / agency competency. Solutions are being sought
from across the US Government and academia.
In addition, a 2014 investigation explored megacities for Pacific
Command.17 The objective was to prototype a relevant, low-cost and
effective method of producing early indication and tracking of the social,
political, environmental, and economic sources of state and population
fragility and failure in large urban environments. The intention was to
provide a prototype assessment methodology broadly applicable to other
commands and agencies. The Army now sponsors an off-shoot of the
2014 program through the Corps of Engineers.
The Urban Security Project is a methodology to develop geo-temporal
map layers representing socio-cultural analysis indicators necessary for
planning, assessment, and situational awareness. It uses spatio-temporal
representation of populations and offers long-term monitoring of urban
conditions.18 Such analysis benefits ground forces during planning and
execution of urban operations. One valuable resource for obtaining
local information comes from indigenous law enforcement. The nexus
of military ground forces and indigenous law enforcement further supports the Army as the pragmatic choice to implement urban strategy at
the tactical level and test concepts in cities. Recent experience provides
additional supporting evidence for designating the Army as executive
agent.
The Army’s tactical familiarity with local law enforcement in Iraq
provides another tangible and practical example of why the Army is best
suited to lead urban operations. In most military operations, perhaps
other than full-scale combat, land forces gain local knowledge and
benefit from a close relationship with local law enforcement. Some resist
the idea of US ground forces teaming with police forces. Corruption,
16     Andrew Bell, email message to author, December 10, 2014. Preliminary Report of Unified
Quest 2014: Megacities and Army Capability Needs Observed at Unified Quest 2014. Bell served
on the JFCOM Joint Urban Operations Office staff.
17     Charles Ehlschlaeger, ed., Understanding Megacities with the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and
Intelligence Paradigm, Topical Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) and US Army Engineer
Research Development Center (ERDC) Multi-Agency/Multi-Disciplinary White Papers in Support
of National Security Challenges (Champaign, IL: US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research
and Development Center, April 2014).
18      Charles R. Ehlschlaeger (US Army Engineer Research Development Center), interview with
the author, December 3, 2014.
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jurisdictional restrictions, and interference with military operations
are some of the concerns. However, this reluctance must be overcome.
Police forces provide “ground-truth” through their local knowledge
and human intelligence through their informants. Just as a beat cop
gains better situational understanding of neighborhoods, intelligence
preparation of the battlefield must provide a keen sense of ground-truth.
Indeed, indigenous police forces can become force multipliers when the
US commits “boots-on-the-ground.”
Army Strategic Study Group researchers did not reference previous
joint experimentation or joint concepts in their 2014 white paper on
megacities; nor were Army researchers familiar with past joint work.
The main reason for this omission was the demise of JFCOM, resulting
in an incomplete integrative approach and inconsistent staff expertise.
JFCOM’s documents now reside in the National Archives.
Knowledge from the results of past joint experimentation could prevent
unnecessary duplication by Army staff officers now resuscitating urban
concept development. Fortunately, lack of contextual, joint background
is not slowing Army efforts.
The human domain and urban operating environments may redefine
how the Army organizes, equips, and operates its formations and how
it trains and educates its leaders. The Army is considering establishing
an urban studies program, possibly at West Point, to educate leaders on
societal and cultural nuances of the urban-based human domain.19 New
Army leaders will enhance their cultural knowledge and language skills
and refer to joint concepts that emphasize hybrid warfare, peace operations, and counterinsurgency as primary Army missions. The evolving
paradigm is a big departure from the combined arms maneuver mantra
mentioned earlier, “close with and destroy the enemy.”
Rather than a maneuver brigade combat team as the foundational
organizing structure, concepts for conventional force formations in
urban spaces could experiment with using tailored, smaller units possibly company-team size with embedded interagency and indigenous
enablers. The full range of military operations into tactical urban operating environments could employ scalable, capabilities-based formations.
The small unit organizing concept works well for Special Forces and
is faster and easier to deploy to a theater, less cumbersome to maneuver and sustain in an urban environment, and values adaptive, flexible
leaders – all current Army hallmarks. How willing are current senior
Army leaders, raised on combined arms maneuver, to invest in this new
paradigm? The dialogue is intensifying now.

The Army as DoD’s Executive Agent

The 2014 Strategic Study Group white paper convinced Army
leadership that megacities (a term no longer in vogue with many in the
Army–dense urban population centers appears to be the preferred term
now) are a challenge uniquely relevant to land forces. The 2014 Army
Operating Concept envisions urban areas as central to the Army’s future

19      Patrick Mahaney (COL, US Army, Chief of Staff for CSA’s Strategic Studies Group, AY
2014/15), interview with the author, January 15, 2015.
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operational environment.20 However, after 15 years of urban study, it
appears US land forces are still vulnerable in those environments.
Given this premise, seeking DoD executive agency and the requisite
authorities it provides is warranted. By pursuing executive agency Army
leadership signals commitment to joint urban concept development and
permits the Army to provide an integrative, functional leader for the
Joint Force. The Joint Chiefs should promote the restoration of DoD
executive agency for Joint Urban Operations and recommend shifting
JFCOM’s former role to the Army. As Joint Executive Agent the Army
should regain DoD authority, responsibility, and funding curtailed after
JFCOM’s disestablishment. Updating DoD’s Joint Urban Operations
Master Plan will result in better collective joint readiness under Army
leadership.
Developing a narrative for a renewed urban strategy that resonates
with senior DoD executives is a critical next hurdle. Army options for
future structure and risk center on what kind of warfighting they will
encounter. Army leadership should advocate for a Secretary of Defense
approved urban campaign as part of a defense planning scenario to
establish a valid program requirement in a future Army program objective memorandum.
The Army must evaluate urban force capability needs across the full
range of military operations, determine how that capability differs from
traditional conventional force needs for other operating environments,
and make force development investment decisions to organize, train,
and equip the force. However, there is a shortfall in solid analysis supporting assessment of force capability options and definition of Army
requirements. Preparing for urban operations will become vital for
land forces and should be the purview of the Army. Concept development within the Army transitions to Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), and will become the responsibility of Army Capabilities
Integration Center by June 2015.21

Comparing JFCOM’s and the Army’s Approaches

Once the Army succeeds in establishing joint executive agency,
it must resolve discrepancies between Army and joint concepts.
Comparative analysis finds that with few exceptions, current Army
Strategic Studies Group thinking aligns well with joint concepts. One
example of a critical disparity between joint and Army concepts stems
from an Army doctrinal requirement to isolate an urban area and to
approach it incrementally from the periphery of the city.
In contrast, the Strategic Studies Group white paper stated, “For
megacities, both of the assumptions [isolation and operating from the
periphery] are flawed. By virtue of their scale, megacities cannot be
physically or virtually isolated.”22 However, JFCOM’s experimentation
validated the guiding principles—isolation and control. A clear disparity

20      US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex
World 2020-2040, 12.
21      Patrick Mahaney, interview with author.
22      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army:
Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future, 8.
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thus exists between Joint and current Army concepts. This conceptual
difference must be overcome.
This conceptual disconnect may be situational. Service doctrines
must be broad enough to cover the full range of potential operations, yet
flexible enough for commanders to adapt to ground truth. Urban environments come in many forms so there is no single, scalable solution.
Control of the entire city may not be a realistic objective and need
not be an essential task. Stopping adversaries from damaging sociocultural and financial networks and protecting other urban networks
such as key city infrastructure may suffice. Future experiments must
determine if, or how, Joint Forces could virtually or selectively isolate
adversaries when physical isolation of an entire city is not achievable.
In addition, it may be wise not to fixate on population size as a
qualifier for operational analysis. A megacity is but one variation of an
urban system. Though an important metric for scale and determining
force-size, population size does not drive force capability or technology
requirements. Decision-makers should not restrict analysis to megacities
– determining analytic priority should be threat-based. The determining
factors for force capability this research recommends follow:
•• Mission–humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, counterinsurgency, combat, etc
•• Threat–terrorism, paramilitary, insurgency, state-sponsored conventional force
•• Urban typology–highly, moderately, or loosely integrated, or some
combination thereof
•• Population density and fragility
•• Physical built environment–subterranean, above ground (high-rise),
infrastructure, etc
•• Understanding how to manage the behavior of city inhabitants
Urban concept development needs analytic tools that support
the development and visualization of these complex environments as
part of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process. Industry
and academia can contribute much. Modeling urban systems relies on
field-based research, remote and local sensing, local networks, and big
data analysis. With Combatant Command sponsorship research could
commence now. The Strategic Multi-layer Assessment Program offers
social science research and analysis techniques suited for urban shaping
operations. One promising area is data collection. Techniques employing
indigenous surveyors offer the most accurate information and should be
expanded.

Urban Metrics Needed

As mentioned earlier, strategic landpower leadership promotes a
security strategy focusing on the human domain to prevent war and
shape security environments.23 It follows, then, that a security strategy

23      Raymond Odierno, James Amos, and William McRaven, Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash
of Wills (Washington, DC: US Army, US Marine Corps, and US Special Operations Command, May
2013).
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based on the human domain and conflict prevention requires metrics to
gauge the effectiveness of shaping and engagement activities. Ultimately
metrics must reveal the will of populations. “Make the important measurable,” as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reportedly
urged, “instead of making the measurable important.”24
But, measuring prevention is difficult, if not impossible. How can
one prove or measure whether something was prevented from occurring? Metrics tend to focus on inputs.25 Measures of effectiveness for
shaping and engagement activities are unclear and determined by individual geographic commands.
Given the complexity and interconnectedness of urban environments, assessing the effectiveness of shaping and engagement activities
is impossible without first having an understanding of the desired
end state. This requires formulating likely objectives under a variety
of missions and then empirically determining factors most likely to
be associated with those objectives. In order for land forces operating
in populated urban spaces to achieve strategic effect, they ultimately
must rely on direct connections between real people – friendly, hostile,
and noncombatant. Current Army shaping activities reflect deterrence
through forward stationing and the Regionally Aligned Force initiative.
Neither focuses on cities, but both rely on the presence of land forces
for their deterrence value.
Land forces cannot adequately prepare for what they do not understand, so some priority cities should become units of analysis. Now is
the time to identify candidate cities for developing specific urban-based,
human domain metrics. Each is unique. There is no better place to start
than in Korea.
Seoul, South Korea is a megacity which by Mutual Defense Treaty
the US will protect and defend. It is an excellent first candidate to develop
specific metrics for an urban operating environment. The rationale for
selecting Seoul is multifaceted. The Army presence in Seoul spans over
60 years. The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the US are in the process
of a historic transfer of operational control from US-led military readiness and preparedness to ROK control. The ROK-US Alliance permits
superb cooperation for collaboration and study of urban environments.
The defense of the ROK requires a large commitment of land
forces. The 23 million people living in the Greater Seoul Metropolitan
Area constitute the economic, political, and cultural center of gravity of
a staunch US partner. Actions needed to defend Seoul could span the
full range of military operations. With approximately 200,000 US citizens residing in South Korea, the vast majority in Seoul, noncombatant
evacuation of US citizens and humanitarian assistance for ROK civilians under threat of attack by North Korean sleeper agents and Special
Forces would stress early contingency response.

24      Sarah Bessell, “Behind the Numbers: Assessing Indices of Peace, Conflict and Instability,”
United States Institute of Peace, November 1, 2007, http://www.usip.org/publications/behind
-the-numbers-assessing-indices-of-peace-conflict-and-instability.
25      Janine Davidson (Former OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, currently
Senior Defense Fellow for Policy with the Council on Foreign Relations), e-mail to author, January
22, 2015.
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Contingency scenarios involving the North Korean regime link to
Pyongyang, another excellent choice for assessment, although a far more
difficult place to survey. The inhabitants of Pyongyang are loyal regime
disciples, tens of thousands belong to the Pyongyang’s Supreme Guard
Command and Kim Jong-un’s Bodyguard Corps. Clearly there are a
plethora of candidate cities, but Seoul and Pyongyang, a priority for
contingency planning, offer several practical advantages for initiating
city analyses.

A Way Forward

A thorough qualitative understanding of urban operating environments should precede anticipated quantitative analysis. Charting a path
forward requires accelerated attention to several areas. Defining a set of
actionable tasks from the insights and lessons from the past 13 years of
conducting urban operations, counter-irregular warfare, and a decade of
joint urban concept development would be a worthy early deliverable for
Army concept developers. To gain a better sense of how new research
might treat capability gaps with objective analysis the effort needs a new
roadmap. The following actions are thus recommended:

Recommended OSD Actions

•• Restore JFCOM’s Executive Agent responsibility with the Army
•• Support programming requirements by approving an urban campaign
as part of a Defense Planning Scenario
•• Designate cities as units of analysis

Proposed Army Actions

•• Gain Joint Readiness Oversight Council approval for a Joint
Capabilities Document
•• Formulate likely Army objectives under a variety of urban missions
•• Determine priority cities for analysis
In sum, JFCOM’s prior Joint Urban Operations mission is similar
to the Army’s current challenge, the Army should become DoD’s Joint
Executive Agent for urban operations. Ultimately, the Army must
evaluate urban force capability needs across the full range of military
operations, determine how that capability differs from traditional
conventional force needs for other operating environments, and make
force development investment decisions to organize, train, and equip
the force.

